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between religious
O~'te the theological and popularly conceived connections
.
I"
~
devotion and moral living, the difficulties ~~en~ing theo!oglcal or re Iglous et ICS~
h ttempt to tie ethics to theology or rehglon 10 some Important sense-are myn
t de ;hanks largely to Enlightenment thought, morality has come to, be construed as
~In d'e p
dent of God so much so that the majority of moral ph!losophers today
en,
. . "
t
would without hesitation affirm that even If God eXists, .morahty can e~lst apar
from God-an ontological critique-and, if the precepts or dictates of morahty can, be
known at all, they can be known apart from religious orthodoxy or theological
reflection-an epistemological critique,
.
.
Since the Enlightenment, at least, and in particular since Kant' s eplstemologl~al
dualism, questions of religion and "speculative ~et~phY,sics" have often been consldd beyond the ken of rationality, I Kant's motivation, It has been suggested, was to
~~:re religion from the rigorous scrutiny of ~h,e emergi~g ,science .of his day; but the
actual result proved to be detrimental to rehglous conViction, ,for It began to be portrayed as an inescapably subjective affair. Un~ver~al ,truth c1al1?S ~ecame h~rder to
reconcile with this kind of epistemology, which IS hkely the me~lt~ble while p~ra
doxical effect of implicitly putting religion and science at odds, Rehglous truth cl,alms
tend to be increasingly construed as devoid of propositio~al con ten: ~nd r.atlo~al
evidence and are instead seen as empty faith claims rooted 10 a person s Imagmatlon
or a group's collective psyche,
"
.
The understanding of science and religion as essentially and ~Istoncally ?pposed,
incidentally, is largely mistaken, Although it is true that certam ,t~eologlans and
churchmen have historically stood in the way of scientific progress, It IS fa,r from true
that all of them have even a majority; and in fact, as Alfred North Whlteh~ad has
persuasively argued, the origins of modern science, such as faith in the orderhness of
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nature and its ability to be apprehended and described rationally, are largely att 'b
, d ' t ' n often seems at the heart of basing ethics on theology, Seemingly altruistic
,
'"
,
n utabl ,I 5 can I 10
,
"
,
,
h
'
to theM
ed leval and ScholastIC effort to ratIonalize the dIVInely ordered creation 2 S e ,u11 ,
thus motivated at theIr root would then reveal self-Interested motIvations, rat er
'
f
h
'
,
"
'tanl
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
s
,
'
'
I
f
'
ey
D ding the poor, clothing the naked, and hOUSIng the home ess out 0 genu~ne conJa kI goes urt ~r In charactenzIng such foundations of science as the conseque
orthodox Chnstology, "A truly divine Logos, in Whom the Father created nee of than cee tl m and their welfare, the ultimate motivation would instead be sheer self-Interest.
' , , d'
,
all s
ern lor 1e
,
'
'
'I'
A thanaSIUS
mSlste tIm~ and agam, cou~d not pro,duce a partially ?isordered universe,"; 0 C The power of God to effect, his pur~oses mIght certamly constItute a I~OtlVe to Ive
Nonetheless the mistakenly perceIved tenSIon between SCIence and religio
II ' such a scenario, albeIt an ethIcally dangerous one, but not a ratIonal reason.
,
I n
,
' fantI'I e, some h ave
t n'b ute d to th'
elr artl'fi'
ICial separatIon,
It was long thought that morality could be s nI con- mora y
h purely self-interested
moral ,
motIVatIons
are necessan'I y 10
,
a
vaged
i\ny
suc
,
' f h'ld
h
'
from suc h a fate by bemg rooted 10 reason rather than revelation, Indeed th' cc
d For they are roughly akin to the truncated ethical perspectIve 0 c I ren, w 0
cc '
,
'
IS ellOrt argue,
"
f
'd'
serves as one ellectlve summary of the Enlightenment: to ground ethics in reaso
' the earliest stages of moral development, understand moralIty m terms 0 avol mg
d
th
b
"
h"
c
n
rather
also,
In
,
P H
"
than
I
,
re IgIO~ an
ere, y retam Its aut ont~tIve lor,ce, However, severed from its ontolo _ unishm ents and eaming rewards, DraWIng
on P"Iage~ s, researc h ~f young ch'ldren
,I
',"
Ical foundatIOns, moralIty has proved notonously dIfficult to undergird by reason ala g p
ll-Smith argues for such a parallel between religIOUS moralists and chIldren In the
much so that the Enlightenment project has recently often been characterized as a tel' so Nowe no mous stage of development, since both groups, while lacking in those marks of
'h
"
,
'"
, "',
al ure, hetero
'b'l"
I
O ne resu It IS
t at morality, stili often perceived to be m religIon s vIcmlty IS increa '
I maturity and adulthood such as autonomy and personal responsl I Ity, VIew mora
,
'
Singly mora
, 5
b b d '
a sor e mto Kant s noumenal realm ~f t~~ unkno,:able" insc~table and, for practical rules as sacred and authoritati,ve,ly iI~posed fro~, the oU~Id~, ,
'
purpos,es, thereby const~ed, ~s a, pure~y mdIvldual affair, ThIS despIte the obvious fact that
At the heart of Nowell-SmIths cntIque of relIgIOUS ethICS IS,hIS concem ;h~t It tends to be
Kant hImself was no sUbjectIVIst
m ethICS,
,
more concemed with adherence to rules rather than the qualIty of people s lIves and, a conPre-~odern and, w~at IS often call,ed p~st-modern :hought have in common their cern for people's welfare for their own sake, Rules, as seen by t,he morall~ ~ature, ex~st for a
gro,undm? of morality 10 God, the salIent difference bemg that p~e-n:oderns, generally, purpose and fulfill distinct functi~ns. But the heteronomous chIld ~nd relIgIOUS moralist both
believed 10 ,GOd: whereas post-moderns, ~en~rally, do ~ot. If moralIty IS rooted in a Cod regard rules as, in essence, ends 10 themselves, ,n~ver to be, ques~oned, Even Abraham, the
:vho d?esn t eXIst, of ~ourse, then morality IS largely Illusory; and this seems to be an ' Old Testament patriarch, is shown laudably WIlling to sacnfice hIS own ~~n on the altar, at
mcreasmgly common VIew: that morality is either purely conventional, or a way to ke
rl1 him of the divine, By thus relinquishing one's moral autonomy to dIvme control; bemg
the proletariat in line, or a repression of our best instincts, and the list goes on, No wo~ ex~:sivelY concerned, even pathologically preoccupied, about the welfare of on~'s, soul; and
der that some have tried to show that traditional conceptions of morality can exist inde- making moral detenninations based on God's commands, potentially even capnclous ones,
pendently of ,any appeal ~o theology, and I ha:e a certain sympathy for such efforts, religious moralists betray childish elements in their ethical philosophy"
"
Nonetheless, l:ke many theISts, I also have a naggmg sense that morality, ultimately, has to
Even supposing that God does issue a command to human bemgs, such as the most
be, groun~ed m God. So, in th,is, paper, :vha,t I intend to do is, first, identify some of the important" command to love God with all ~f your, heart, ~oul, mind, a~d strength, ,and
philosop~Ical problems for religIOUS ethICS In general and Christian ethics in particular. your neighbor as yourself, another problem ImmedIately anses, one which K,ant nO~ICed
Then I will attempt a short defense of a Christian theistic ethic,
and contemporary philosopher Richard Taylor elaborates on,6 SU,ch an edict can t, be
issued, for love, as an emotion, can't be commanded, An ought req~Ires a can; no sensIble
RELIGIOUS ETHICS CRITIQUED
command requires of us to do that which we are incapable of domg, The command to
love as a command to assume an emotional disposition toward God or another, treats
To begin with, morality, as religiously construed, is often thought of as either a requirehu~an emotion as something under direct volitional control. Since it is not-we can't
ment or result of salvation. As such it is depicted as necessary for, in one sense or another
directly generate emotions at will-the command is nonsensical. Duty and love se~m
a relationship with God and entrance into heaven, Conversely, an immoral life is charac:
incompatible in an ethical system; yet religious ethics conjoin them, ano~her problem WIth
terized in terms of an absence of a relationship with God and punishable by consignment
to hell. As such, a moral life is enjoined by religion, it is suggested, merely, in J. p,
rooting morality in theology, In this connection, Taylor writes the followmg:
Moreland's words, to "cover one's cosmic rear end to avoid getting flames on it.'"
The insight that love, as a feeling, is incompatible with the incentive of duty: is
One criticism of such ethical views is that morality entails a quality of life that ought to
plainly correct. In the light of it one can expunge feelings of love from theoretical
be conducted primarily, if not exclusively, out of a desire to do it and not mainly, if at all,
ethics, or one can expunge the incentive of duty. Kant took the former course,
out of a motivation to avoid punishment or earn a reward, The latter, which is argued to
be the thrust behind religious ethics, would constitute an egoistic approach to ethics,
and I take the latter?
according to which, as seen, moral decisions are made with respect to "what's in it for me,"
Besides those problems associated with religious ethics, one philosophical problem,
Moral philosophers, often influenced by Kant, typically bristle, and rightly so, at the sugmore than any other, has been a thorn in the flesh of theologians and rel!gious mo~al
g~st,ion th~t rr:orality's motivation is one of earning a reward or avoiding a punishment.
philosophers since the time of Plato, and has been dubbed the Euthyphro DIlemma, ansDIVme retnbutIon or reward seems unable to be a legitimate form of moral motivation, yet
J
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ing as it does in the Socratic dialogue Euthyphro. Socrates, Plato's teacher, meets a you
man, Euthyphro, going to the courthouse to sue his father. In ancient Greece, the setting
for this story, loyalty to family was a highly exalted virtue, so Socrates is naturally shock n~
at Euthyphro's intention to do this, and remarks that Euthyphro must have a c1ea~
defined sense of justice to undertake such an ambitious course of action. Euthyphro coni
dently assures Socrates that in fact he does, and proceeds to define justice, or what w
might c~1I morality today, in terms of the commands of the gods, according to the Gree~
conceptl~n of a pantheon of gods. W~en Socrates begins to point out that, according to
the mythical accounts of the gods, their commands sometimes conflicted, problems with
Euthyphro's account begin to manifest themselves.
The problems attending the attempt to define morality in supernaturalistic terms Soon
become applicable to monotheism as well, as the famous Dilemma arises a little further
along in the dialogue. Socrates asks Euthyphro a pointed question, and one that has
plagued moral philosophy ever since. Does, to put this in monotheistic terms, God define
the good, or merely report the good? There is a difference. When you tell another that the
sum of two and two is four, you are merely reporting this to be the case, not somehow
making or defining it that way of your own volition. The question is whether God reveals
to us the contents of morality irrespective of his own commands or nature, in which case
he would be merely reporting on morality and not ultimately responsible for its contents
after all, or does He actually define morality, conforming its contents to his own will? If
we affirm the former option-that God only reports the good-then we have to agree
with the thrust of contemporary moral philosophy that has divorced God from morality's
ultimate origins. God would be commanding something because it is already good prior
to and independent of his command. If we wish to affirm the latter option-that God
defines morality (then and only then perhaps reports itl-then we're confronted with a
potential problem. For then something is good because God commands it, but suppose
that God, tomorrow, were to decree that torturing innocent children for the fun of it is
the moral thing to do. If God is the one exclusively responsible for dictating the contents
of morality, there is no recourse for anyone else to claim that such a command is morally
perverse. By issuing the decree, God has thereby redefined morality. Morality is thus arbitrary, entirely contingent on the capricious will of heaven.
Of course, the history of religious conquest, holy wars, and inquisitions reminds us that
cruelty in the name of God, ostensibly in accord with his purposes, is no academic discussion. Measured by its own standards, Christianity has fallen woefully short of ethical greatness, reminding us that belief in God is by no means sufficient for ensuring a mature ethical way of life, as the number of religious adherents who have perpetrated evils in the
name of God so clearly attests. Nor is religious adherence even a needed precondition for
moral living, it would seem, for many atheists indeed live exemplary lives of moral excellence. Kai Nielsen thus argues that, even if "God is dead," it doesn't matter for ethics.
Arguing from features he finds in this world, Nielsen points out that atheists often live
altruistically, find meaning in life, express compassion, thereby going to show that God
seems unnecessary for ethics. B Ethics can get by just fine without him.
Given such glaring weaknesses and strong critiques of religious ethics, it is not surprising that Derek Parfit is one among others who claims that holding on to outmoded reli-

9

views is an impediment to moral philosophy that had better be jettisoned as soon as
ssible. Indeed, some have essentially asserted that theistic beliefs, rather than grounding
par morality and enabling us to determine the normative contents and metaethical justifioU
tiOn for our moral convictions, can actually perform the opposite function of blinding us
~~ morality as rooted in reason or human flourishing or whatever precisely it is that serves
s the true foundation for morality. "Belief in God, or in many gods," Parfit writes, "[hasl
arevented free development of moral reasoning." Parfit is optimistic about the possibility
~f progress in ethics precisely to the extent we extricate ourselves from superstitious reliaiouS beliefs and begin to reason autonomously.9

a.OUS
"I

"
THEISTIC ETHICS DEFENDED

Against such arguments, and contrary to the trend in modem moral philosophy, theistic
ethics will nevertheless now be defended, with the aim to show that the case against it has
yet to be made. What will be provided here, with no pretense that every relevant question is
answered or problem solved, are a few suggestive lines of arguments that show promise in
salvaging a meaningful connection between God and morality in the face of such challenges.
This section will make reference to theistic, rather than religious or theological, ethics to
denote the fact that the type of connection between God and morality that will be
defended, though it will possess numerous practical implications, will generally be at a
higher level of abstraction than the plane on which this topic is usually discussed. It will be
more ontological than epistemological and more metaethical than normative. Too often,
it seems, theistic ethics have to account for the failings of religionists to live morally, or the
successes of atheists in attaining moral excellence, while such phenomena, reflection
shows, do little to discount the possibility that God himself is the Author of morality irrespective of what is done by some of his alleged followers or detractors.
No doubt it is particularly a concern the way religious adherents have too often failed
to live up to even minimal moral standards, but the attempted defense of theistic ethics
provided here will have little difficulty accommodating such empirical sociological realities.
Religious affiliation or mere propositional assent is often a poor indicator of genuine religious life and spiritual devotion anyway, it is to be remembered. 'The Old Testament
prophets bear eloquent witness to this, reserving some of their fiercest denunciation for
those who delight in solemn assemblies and external ritual," William Abraham reminds
us. IO Jesus himself issued his most damning indictments to the religious leaders of his day. II
MORAL FACTS

So to begin this defense, it is observed that typically socialized human beings have
rather clear moral intuitions about what is right and wrong, or morally exemplary or
hideous, which are more than just hunches or prereflective expressions of moral attitudes.
As Geisler and Moreland write,
While philosophers differ over a precise definition of intuitions, a common usage
defines an intuition as an immediate, direct awareness or acquaintance with something. An intuition is a mode of awareness-sensory, intellectual, or otherwise-in
which something seems or appears to be directly present to one's consciousness. 12
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Ethicists like Ala. sda.ir. Mac.Intyre and R. M. Hare think ethic. ists have gone wrong whe _
I the General derived pleasure from the act, perhaps accounting for the characterin' when er
.'
. n of such behavIor as mhuman.
.
.
IS I ICU t to see what could be said more strongly for a view than that it square .
zatI°ust as there is an unfittingness about the General's action, there is an obvIous fittI~g, b'
fl . . . .
P .
S With
I d congruity about morally good behavior generally and morally exceIIent be h aVlor
one s aSIC, re ectlve mtUltlons. hllosophy ought to be largely in the business of s II'
.
h
b
'
pe
Ing
ness
. c·
f
I'ty" "Mora I people
Ou t '
10 more ngorous ways w at can e mtuitively grasped by nearly anyone. Such .
. anlarly resulting in what has been called the "satlslactIons
0 mora I.
..
I '
Intu- partlcU
,
.
.
ft
I"
th t
ItIve appea s seem both unavoidable and epistemologically significant. Though not i C I'
long testified as to the strength and value of such satIsfactions, 0 en c almmg a
ble, th ey are at Ieast pnma
. fi"
'fi
nla
Iihave
.
.
'
"IS
aae JUSti led'
are the most agreeable satIsfactIons we can attam.
h
hThe French philos~pher Jean-Paul Sartre, in an effort to argue for his existentialist t e~ehaviors characterized as morally exemplary are typically t~ose which, !f. an agent
rf ms them she is said to be morally praiseworthy, whereas, If the agent falls to peret ICS, uses examples lIke a young soldier deciding whether to go to war or to stay h
and .be his m.ather'.s consolati~n.lJ. Sartre empl?~s su~h ex.a~ples to show the difficUI;~~ f:~~hem, sh~ isn't blameworthy. Such behaviors are th~ught of as ?oling beyon~fiwhatfis
makmg certam ethical determmatlons, and wntmgs lIke hiS 10 conjunction with the w'd
t d of the moral agent such as a selfless life of service to the SIC <, or a sacn Ice 0 a
l _
spread use of what Christina Hoff-Sommers has called "dilemma ethics"-moral dl'alo e expect' e medical career to ~erve the needs of a destitute village. Philosophers call such
c
gUe lucra Ive
.
b
locused on trying. to. decide the "hard cases" -have contributed to the notion that the
.
supererogatory and sometimes debate whether such behaViors can even e
h I fi
actions
,
.'
.. . .
.
d'
woe ~eld.of ethiCS IS colored g.rey. The old certainties are gone; ambiguity wins the day.
modated according to normative ethical theory. UtllItananIsm, for mstance, oesn t
Everyth 109 IS up Clor gra bs w h en It comes to questions of morality.
accom
. . . 0 f Uti'1'Ity one,smora I ° bl'19Iy SL/flflest maximizing utility, but renders the maXimization
D . h
mere
!:J!:J
•
•
1'1
. I
.
. esplt~ t .e common .nature of such views, most decisions in ethics are not fraught ariOI1, thus raising the question of whether there ever really IS anythmg I <e optlona pralsew~t~ ambigUIty and tensions between commensurate competing commitments. As is worthy moral action. 16
. . ,
•
? VIOUS fro.m .clear exampl~s of moral behavior, the vast majority of people's moral intuThe aspect of supererogatory actions that will be stressed for thiS dlscusslo~, though, IS
Itlons remam mtact and qUite strong. Perhaps ethics are too often thought about in ter
different. Irrespective of the relative obligation one thinks att~ches. to su~h actions, the less
of the peripheral dilemmas and occasional ambiguities, overlooking and thereby skew~s arguable and most obvious element of supererogatory actions IS their lau~abWI~ selfl~ss
o~r perception of the vast intuitive area of agreement that actually obtains both acros~ nature that resonates with our, in James Q Wilson's ~hras~, "moral s~nse. . Itn~ssmg
diverse cul~ures and thr~ughout the centuries of human history. Perhaps morality has to
such behavior gives us, we suspect, a portrait of humanIty at ItS best, a glImpse mto lIfe as
b~ ~ee~ at Its best, or at ItS worst, for it is then our intuitions are felt the strongest and the it was meant to be lived, and perhaps one day will be.
.
dlstmctl:re fe~tures of moral facts most clearly apprehended, with no ambiguities or heartConsulting our intuitions, what can we say about the nature of morahty and of mor~l
wrenchmg dIlemmas to cloud our vision. Eventually those dilemmas have to be accountfacts? If moral facts exist, they would seem to be, prima fade, onto logically rather odd ent!ed for, as well, but the s~ggestion here is that they are not the proper place to begin. One
ties as far as most facts go. Moral facts, in addition to conveying a description of nature,
doesn t learn subtle tennIS strategy when he first must learn how to hit a groundstroke.
are also ineliminably prescriptive, normatively involving an appeal to what ought or ought
To elicit such common sensical moral intuitions, consider the following scenario, asking
not to be done. Moral facts thereby direct us to action, confer obligation, in ~ way t~a.t no
merely descriptive fact characterizing some state of affairs can do without bemg conJomed
yourself whether you can affirm the moral propriety of such an action:
~v~:~n alPpea I to mtUltlons IS neces.sary; but I rather agree wIth Saul Kripke's view: that it

!hey brought the boy out of the guardroom. It was a bleak, foggy, raw day-an
Ide~1 day f~r huntin~. The General ordered the boy stripped naked. The boy [who
whIle playmg had madvertently injured the General's dog] was shivering. He
seemed paralyzed with fear. He didn't dare utter a sound. 'Off with him now chase
him!' 'Hey, you, run, run!' a flunkey yelled, and the boy started to run. 'Sic 'i~!' the
General roared. The whole pack was set on the boy and the hounds tore him to
pieces before his mother's eyes. 14
Those chilling lines from Fyodor Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov sicken readers
filling them with moral indignation. Common sense moral intuitions declare such an ac~
to b~ heinous and barbaric. Sartre's point would have been lost had he begun not with a
genume moral dilemma, but with an appeal to people's moral intuitions, such as by asking
:-rhether the General should have acted in this way. The answer is clear. Something
mcongruous is readily discernible about the General's actions, quite irrespective of

J

with at least implicitly prescriptive ones.
. . '
Morality is thought to confer obligations and provide evaluative constral.nts n~t J~st on
particular acts or ways of life, but even on our motivations. Saving ~ dr?wnIng child 10 the
hope of eaming a reward, though resulting in a good c?ns~quence, IS ~tlll ~enerally thought
of as less than morally exemplary behavior. Moral motivations, as earher discussed, need to
largely transcend the hope of a reward or the effort to avoid a punishment to include genuine concern for the welfare of others, sincere desire to alleviate suffering, etc.
Morality, in its dominant tradition in western culture, involves rights and .duties, rights
to which people are entitled and obligations conferred upon p~ople, sometimes. at great
personal sacrifice. Morality involves the ascription of moral praise and ~Iame, elt~er .for
actions performed or actions failed to be performed. The moral confern~g of.obhgatlon
and the assigning of blame, it is thought, are not contingent on th~ satisfaction. of. the
moral agent's personal interest or advantage, but seem to po.sses.s a .kl~d of ~uthonty .Irrespective of such considerations. That morality seems to proVide mtnnslc motives to virtue
without at the same time always providing instrumental advantages based on prudence
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the same, inscribed in an intelligent heaven although, of course, there is no Cod. In
has been long thought to be one of the great ethical difficulties left unsolved. 17
The oddness of moral facts is obviously in part attributable to this prescriptive feat
. other words ... nothing will be changed if Cod does not exist; we shall discover the
· w h'ICh, perh
.
Ure
same norms of honesty, progress and humanity, and we shall have disposed of Cod
of th elrs
aps,'IS what motIVated
G. E. Moore to conclude that no naturalist'
ls
as an out-of-date hypothesis which will die away quietly of itself. The existentialist, on
pr?po.sal for constructing a definition of "good" could suffice. Moore characterized t~C
the contrary, finds it extremely embarrassing that Cod does not exist, for there disapmlsg~l~ed. attempt to define "good" by reducing it to any natural property-such as th:
pears with him all possibility of finding values in an intelligible heaven. There can no
maXimization of pleasure or the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people-b
longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to
th: term "~a~uralist~c f~llacy." No merely naturalistic property seems able to accommodat~
think it. It is nowhere written that "the good" exists, that one must be honest or must
this prescnptlvely bmdmg force characterizing morality traditionally understood.
not lie, since we are now upon the plane where there are only men. 21
Th?ught of i~ ten~s of this tricky prescriptive element that enjoins a certain kind of
behavior, Moore s pomt can be construed along the lines of David Hume's writing from
Likewise, the Cerman philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche confidently proclaimed that the
two ~ent~ries before, in which he criticized the attempt to derive an ought from an is. Such ,
a denvauon has been described in various ways, such as going from a description to a pre- I "death of Cod" should have for one of its practical outcomes a Copernican revolution in
scription, from a fact to a nann or value, or from an indicative to an imperative. The same idea I the way we think of ethics. Traditionally exalted moral virtues such as humility, altruism,
would appear later in Kant's insistence that the dictates and imperatives of the moral law ' and compassion, now seen as expressions of abject weakness, should be eclipsed with the
strong virtues of selfishness, ruthlessness, and pride. In Nietzsche's case, then, upholding tracan't be derived from any set of propositions about human happiness or the will of Cod. 19
Rather than discussing Moore's or Hume's point at great length, which has been done ditional morality after the death of God wasn't even a concern; it was his agenda to effect
22
elsewhere by numerous writers, here the discussion will instead focus on what constitutes his transvaluation of values, according to which good might be called evil, and evil good.
Irrespective of one's views of Nietzsche and his legacy, his is one more example of
the best explanation of such ontologically odd entities as moral facts, if indeed they exist at
all. Rather than morality, given its distinct features, needing to be divorced from God's atheists themselves recognizing the vital link between Cod and traditionally understood
nature or will, the opposite conclusion has often been drawn, even by no less a thinker than moral values, between theism and ethics. The violence potentially done to morality by its
the influential twentieth-century atheist J. L Mackie. "Moral properties," the late philosopher divorce from Cod is not a warning issued only by theists. A number of thoughtful
wrote, "constitute so odd a cluster of properties and relations that they are most unlikely to philosophers, both theists and atheists, have drawn the conclusion that, if Cod does not
exist, then morality, understood as something more than convention or conditioning
have arisen in the ordinary course of events without an all-powerful god to create them."20
That is, according to Mackie, moral facts-entities ascribing praise and blame for actions alone, lacks a firm foundation or, to use Paul Taylor's word, "grounding."
W. T. Stace, attributing the emergence of moral relativism to the social, intellectual, and
committed or omitted; conferring duties irrespective of the moral agent's cares and interests; calling for sacrifice of self-interest and, quite independent of outcomes, a purity of psychological conditions of our time, diagnoses the situation as follows:
moral motivation-have for their best explanation, assuming they exist, a theistic premise.
We have abandoned, perhaps with good reason, the oracles of the past. Every age, of
Unless Cod somehow caused such strange facts to come into existence, they are othercourse, does this. But in our case it seems that none of us knows any more whither to
wise most unlikely to have developed naturalistically.
tum. We do not know what to put in the place of that which has gone. What ought
As an atheist, Mackie was dubious about the existence of such moral facts; but his senwe, supposedly civilized peoples, to aim at? What are to be our ideals? What is right?
timent-expressible in terms of the counterfactual conditional "If moral facts exist then
What is wrong? What is beautiful? What is ugly? No man knows. We drift helplessly
Cod probably created them" -could not be more eloquently echoed by any theist.' Since
in this direction and that. We know not where we stand nor whither we are going.21
Cod's nonexistence or irrelevance would negate the consequent of Mackie's conditional
it is not surprising that he and numerous other atheists before and after him have con:
Many atheists and secularists, however, wish to salvage a meaningful morality from the
cluded that their worldview entails a rejection or loss of morality as traditionally underunpalatable implications of their worldview, as even Sartre and Nietzsche attempted.
stood. Sartre, for instance, expressed such a sentiment:
Philosophers thus attempt to defend and account for the existence of moral facts without
any appeal to Cod, thereby also accounting for why we ought to live moral lives and for
Towards 1880, when the French professors endeavored to formulate a secular
why moral obligations sometimes apply even when they conflict with one's personal welmorality, they said something like this: Cod is a useless hypothesis, so we will do
fare. Kurt Baier, for instance, tries this by arguing that morality really is in one's interest
without it. However, if we are to have morality, a society and a law-abiding world, it
after all, thereby accounting for why we ought to live morally. Richard Brandt, as well,
is essential that certain values should be taken seriously; they must have an a priori
acknowledging that duty sometimes violates personal preferences, first concludes that
existence ascribed to them. It must be considered obligatory a priori to be honest, not
whether such a duty ought to be carried through "may vary from one person to another.
to lie, not to beat one's wife, to bring up children and so forth; so we are going to do
It depends on what kind of person one is, what one cares about." But he then proceeds
a little work on the subject, which will enable us to show that these values exist all
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to :vrite, "It is, of course, no defense of one's failure to do one's duty, before others
SOCiety, to say that doing so is not 'reasonable' for one in this sense."24
Or
George Mavrodes responds to such arguments effectively, in my view. In term
. he wntes
.
s of
Bran dt's pomt,

\
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of course (and I suspect to a large
i coIlScience and the satisfactions of morality-succeeds,
.
1· , b· d·
·d

·It does) that provides no good reason to thmk that mora Ity s m mg Clorce resl es
degre e
,
. .
.
in its prudential advantages-the practical or pragmatic .benefits f?r. th~se. perfo~mmg the
. ns For such benefits might well be the result of domg what IS mtnnslcally nght. Take
actio .
.
.
poor Kavka rightly shows that potential prudential benefits accrue
ase of feeding the
the c
·
.
.
the action of feeding the poor, such as a stronger economy, less nsk of rebellIon, and
And this is just to bring the queer element back in. It is to suppose that besides 'the
to ter numbers of competent workers. But clearly the binding prescriptive component of
kind of person' I am and my particular pattern of 'cares' and interests there is somearea
.
.
" ality Kavka himself would probably agree, is not located m such SOCIal advantages of
thing else, my duty, which may go against these and in any case properly overrides
;~~iIlg 'the pOOr. Morality dictates the intrinsically right .action to be feeding the poor,
them. And one feels that there must be some sense of 'reasonable' in which one
n if no such social benefits were to result. That they m fact do result does not make
can ask whether a world in which that is true is a reasonable world, whether such a
world makes any sense. 25
~~:11 the grounding of morality, especially in the mind of one like Kavka, it would seem,
who retains such a strong set of traditional moral convictions.
. .
Besides accounts like those to make sense of morality apart from appeals to the dlvme,
In response to. ~ra~dt's argument that (a) it is in eve/yones best interest to act morally and,
there is always possible an appeal to brute fact, the theory of metaphysica! intuitionisn: or,
therefore, (b) It IS m my best interest to act morally as well, Mavrodes asks whether (a) is
perhaps, Platonic realism. Perhaps n:oral. facts, including ?bligations at times to sacnfice
~o be ~nderstood c~l1ectively or distributively. If the former, then (b) doesn't follow from
If-interest, are just emergent facts m thiS world, synthetiC necessary truths knowable a
~t, for It may not be m my best interest for everyone to act morally, even if it is in the best
re
I· .
H
mterest of the group as a whole, for the interest of the group as a whole may be ! riol? by a moral intuition, with no explanation possible in terms of natura IStlC pa~s.. ere
advanced by the sacrificing of my interest. If (a) is understood in the distributive sense ; ~le theist is often confronted with a surprisingly formidable opponent. But the theist IS not
Mavrodes notes that another objection arises, namely, that it seems obvious that personal . bligated to show that a theistic universe is the only possible explanation, but merely the
~est explanation. (To show that it's merely a good and coherent explanation would be. an
self-interest, at least in the short run, will be further advanced in a situation in which
accomplishment in many of philosophy's contemporary quarters!) And many athel~ts,
everyone else acts morally but I act immorally, at least in selected cases, than it will in case
everyone, including me, acts morally.26
confronted with the option of this theory of brute facts, on the one hand, and somethmg
like a naturalist's account of the strength of moral intuitions in terms of either deeply held,
It is no doubt to each person's benefit that others act morally, and undoubtedly it is to
habitually conditioned social mores or in terms of moral facts somehow supervening on
e.ach person's benefit that he or she at times act morally. But clearly there are many Occanatural facts, on the other, have found the latter to be the considerably more rational
sions when acting immorally appears to be in an individual's self-interest (or at least when
option. Objective naturalism, in other words, seems the consid.era?ly more ~o~mida~le
acting morally is not in the agent's best interest). It was for this reason that Rene Descartes
expressed the view that
challenge to theistic ethics than intuitionism; and a fuller explication of theistiC ethiCS
would have to confront this challenge more directly. Fruitful lines of inquiry might highlight such challenges naturalism faces in accounting for a sufficient.ly meani.ngful free ~i1l
Since in this life there are often more rewards for vices than for virtues, few would
to undergird morality, how moral prescriptions can be invested With the kmd of qualItaprefer what is right to what is useful, if they neither feared God nor hoped for an
after-life. 27
tive force we think they deserve, or how the quest for reproductive advantage can
explain moral advantage.
It might be suggested that we ought to believe in moral facts for the same reason we
Even Philippa Foot's efforts to argue that morality always gives people some reason to act
ought to believe in brute epistemological facts-such as the propriety of the principle of
le~ves unanswered the question of why people ought to live morally when doing otherabduction: the principle of inference to the best explanation that is being used in this very
wise would go undetected. Such a failure to account for a reason to be moral in such a
essay to argue for theistic ethics. Or construe the suggestion like this: the line of argument
situation has a significance beyond merely the conclusion that what can be motivated
sketched so far might be applied equally well to epistemology as to morality and thereby
are not ~articular acts so much as a general commitment to rules or a moral disposition.
shown unsound. Morality and epistemology do, as a matter of fact, seem to be on a par
Rather, It goes to show that, even if a non-theistic account motivates altruistic behavior it
in critical respects; alleged facts in each arena contain both descriptive and prescriptive
is still deficient to motivate effectively and justify intellectually an altruistic character'-a
components, for instance. However, obligations and sacrifices of self-interest are not nearfurther aspect of morality, captured by the virtue tradition in ethics and related to the
ly as involved in epistemology as in ethics; and violations of epistemological principles,
earlier mention of motives. 28 In Gregory Kavka's attempt to constru~t a reconciliation of
even at their most egregious, simply don't begin to raise people's ire to the degree that the
morality and self-interest, for instance, his project concerns rules of action or ways of life
rather than motives or reasons for action.
General's actions do, nor should they. Nor do the most brilliant applications of the principle of inference to the best explanation inspire people (with the possible exception of a
Even if Kavka's reconciliation project-which makes reference to internal sanctions like
;

T
16

Baggett

I

few analytic philosophers) to the degree of seeing a truly selfless act of love or hero'
srn
So if we don't view it as odd, morality retains distinctive features which afford it a un/ ,
, to mlorm
,c
' of the world,
qUe
capacIty
ourd
un erstandmg
Of, cour~e, some see moral fa,cts as jus~ irredeemabl~ odd, and thus are not convinced
of theIr ,realI,ty at all, The very epIstemologIcal sort of eVIdence adduced here in support f
ontological Issues about ethics leads certain anti-realists in ethics to deny that such ia a
~
eXIst apart from the seemmgly necessary education of human sensibilities, (These philosophers are not to be confused with those "realists" who would cite only social ontology)
H?we:er bedrock our moral intuitions may appear, the argument goes, they are not hardwIred mto ~uman nature, :Vhat ,better proof of this is there, a friend writes, than "the casual, e~en dehghted manner m WhICh small children tear the wings off flies and otherwise torture Insects and torment pets? Children need to learn what cruelty is, and what counts
cruelty,",This point is worthy of much attention, but for now just three brief points will ~
made, FIrst, to show that a process of socialization is necessary for healthy moral develo _
P
ment is not to show it is thereby suffident to account for moral intuitions and their corr
~
'
spon d109 contents, Second, Christianity in particular, with its communal theology of th
human condition a~d its tea~h~ng~ about original sin, ~eems uniquely capable of accountin~
for both the necessIty of soclahzatlOn and the cruelty m men (and boys), Third, it's not pr~
tended here that the admittedly rudimentary comments to follow are enough to persuade
any committed anti-realist in ethics who would reject even the best explanation of moral
facts as inadequate to justify belief in moral facts, But then again, philosophical argument
may sometimes be the least effective means of reaching philosophers,
"

A THEISTIC ACCOUNT

The odd featur~s o~ alleged moral facts strike many philosophers as strange, leading
them to dou,bt theIr eXlste~ce, as we have seen, What these philosophers do, in denying
moral facts, IS conform theIr understanding of the world to their picture of the way the
world ought to look like, Since they can't make sense of moral facts in a determined
~orld with no God, no libertarian freedom, no essential human nature, no room for genume moral responsibility or retributive justice, it is only intellectually honest that many of
them deny the existence of moral facts altogether, chalking moral convictions up to
upbringing and/or society and nothing more,
What will be done here, though, is different: The seeming existence and apparent
nature of moral facts will be used to shape our understanding of the world, Why try to
hammer morality into categories that really presuppose that we already know what the
world is like, all the while turning a deaf ear to morality's instructive nature? Maybe
morality should instead be allowed to affect our view of the world, changing it to include
such entities as moral facts and to accord them epistemic value in our effort at understanding life and its meaning,
If a non-theistic universe fails to provide the best account for the existence of moral
facts, w~at does? Since morality's existence and prescriptive force seem strong, the best
explanatIon of such a state of affairs is, I submit, theism. To put it in Stace's terms our dis- ,
missal of the "oracles of the past" may have been too hasty, The distinctive fe~tures of
moral facts make them more at home, less odd, in a theistic universe than in an atheistic
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one, perhaps making God's ?bit~ary prem~ture, Morality in ,its ,:,ari~us ,features-in~luding
its entailment of genuine oblIgatIon, hbe~tanan freedom, :etnb~tIve JustIce, and sacnfice ?f
self-interest (at least in the short run), WIth love and rela~Ions~Ip as ,paramoun,t-has for Its
t explanation a creative God who has in some sense mscnbed hIS own lovmg, and rel~
~es I nature into the world fashioning human beings in his image and accordmg to hIS
tIona
"
,,
"
'd' d
intentions, and imbuing them wit~ moral mtUItions WhICh, If properly sOCially me late ,
rovide reliable insight into the ethIcal nature of God, themselves, and t~e world,
P The details of such a theistic account do not pretend to have been denved through sheer
, ality here out of whole cloth, but are admittedly the salient moral attributes of God as
ratIon
,
,
I Ch' , , Th
'd
t
understood in the great monotheistic traditions, and partIcular y ,nstIamty, ,at sal ,~os
all of what is presented here is also fully consistent with an AnselmI,an c~ncep,;~on o~ ?elty as
the possessor of the maximally compossible conjunction of t~e vanous ,omm -~uahtles, !he
'lve argument here is that a theistic account of the umverse and Its creation provIdes
~~est
'~"
the best available explanation of our intuitions of mor~hty as possessmg an 0 JectIv~ eXIStence and binding prescriptive force, Such an argument, If made mor~ ~lly, ~ould obvlo~sly
h
to additionally defend theism against pantheism and other rehglous VIews that dIffer
r:~~allY from Christianity, Potential help here might be found in specifically Christian doctri about a personal and immanent God offering transforming grace to enable us to cross
th::moral gap," to use John Hare's phrase, and live the kind of life to which he calls us,
Whether God exists, of course, is no small debate; it's not a question about whether
one more thing exists in the inventory of reality, "It is a question about the ultimate c~n
text for everything else," Morris writes, "The theist and the atheist should see evelythmg
differently,"29 Little wonder that Nielsen's arguments, cited earlier, examined fea~res of
this world, with the assumption that God doesn't exist, and conclude? that mor~h~ c~n
escape unscathed without him. It is also little wonder that those, commItted to behev:ng m
God's existence and who find theistic ethics somehow compellIng are often unconvmced
by such arguments, thinking them hollow and some~ow, missin~ the point. Per~a~s
Dostoevsky was right: if God doesn't exist then everythmg IS permItted, But the ~helst IS
only conjecturing in such a case, for he argues that God does e~ist, as creator of theISts and
atheists alike; and therefore not everything is permitted, negatIvely, and moral truth penetrates the surface of this universe to its core, positively,
Reconsider moral intuitions in light of this, Morality, as traditionally understood, entails
not just rights and duties, but also points toward a whole new set of categories that ma~(~ a
discussion of rights and duties, at best, an emaciated caricature of this new set of reahtles,
Philosopher Eleonore Stump writes that, as C. S, Lewis ~~intained in "0e Pilgrim's Re~ress,
the vision of certain sorts of beauty fills us with an acute If mchoate longmg for somethmgthe source of the beauty perhaps-and a painful sense that we don't possess it, aren't ~art of
it, now,30 Perhaps morality, in certain of its practical exemplifications, is one of thos~ kmds, of
beauty, like in the sacrifice of Christ, and its privation or perversion a form of ughness, hke
the General's treachery,
George Mavrodes, perhaps sensing this same longing, writes
,

I come more and more to think that morality, while a fact, is a twisted and distorted
fact. Or perhaps better, that it is a barely recognizable version of another fact, a ver-
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sion adapted to a twisted and distorted world. It is something like, I suppose, the
way in which the pine that grows at timberline, wind blasted and twisted low
against the rock, is a version of the tall and symmetrical tree that grows lower on
the slopes. I think it may be that the related notions of sacrifice and gift represent
(or come close to representing) the fact, that is, the pattern of life, whose distorted
version we know here as morality. Imagine a situation, an "economy" if you will, in
which no one ever buys or trades for or seizes any good thing. But whatever good
he enjoys it is either one which he himself has created or else one which he
received as a free and unconditional gift. And as soon as he has tasted it and seen
th~t it is good he stands ready to give it away in his tum as soon as the opportunity
anses. In such a place, if one were to speak either of his rights or his duties, his
remark might be met with puzzled laughter as his hearers struggled to recall an
ancient world in which those terms referred to something important.
We have, of course, even now some occasions that tend in this direction. Within
some families perhaps, or even in a regiment in desperate battle, people may for a
time pass largely beyond morality and live lives of gift and sacrifice. On those Occasions nothing would be lost if the moral concepts and the moral language were to
disappear. But it is probably not possible that such situations and occasions should be
more than rare exceptions in the daily life of the present world. Christianity, however, which tells us that the present world is "fallen" and hence leads us to expect a distortion in its important features, also tells us that one day the redemption of the
world will be complete and that then all things shall be made new. 31
Such an account enables an understanding of love in a far less superficial way than any
account whose ultimate components are matter and energy. Jerry Walls writes
Our desire for love and our belief in its importance is supported by the doctrine of
the Trinity, which maintains that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit always existed in a
relationship of perfect love, even before the world was created. So love and relationship are not relative newcomers in the history of the world, which emerged
accidentally from the blind forces of matter. Rather, love and relationship 'go all the
way down' in the structure of reality.32
To put the same point negatively, a theistic ethic adds a qualitatively different and
morally relevant flavor to blameworthy actions, according to which we don't merely
offend people, but God himself. Now it is even clearer, by the way, why the study of
ethics eclipses epistemology in terms of insight into the nature of the universe: God is
rational, but more importantly God is love. It is into this reality that supererogatory
actions, particularly, provide a window.
Love, as God's nature and morality's pinnacle, while containing an ineliminable affective constituent, transcends mere feeling to encompass attitude, action, and character, a
view actually much closer to Kant's meaning (than Taylor's earlier suggestion) when he
said that love as a duty can be commanded. In this way, love, understood as a duty, can
be coherently commanded after all: not as a mere feeling, but as a practical way of life, a
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ible means of treating others.]] God, aware of our inconstant emotional dispositions,
tang ommanding love for himself and others confers on us t he responsl'b'l'
I Ity to exert w hat
by ~rol we can-over our actions-with the intent being that the appropriate feelings and
~~~per motivations-chara~ter-will eventually be formed within us. As Pascal realized,
again in the words of Morns,
Action creates emotion. How we behave can influence, over the long run and
sometimes even on the spot, what attitudes and emotions are operative in our lives.
And these in turn can open our eyes or blind us to aspects of our objective environ34
ment. They can affect deeply our ability to see the world aright.
Think of husbands who claim to have "fallen out of love" with their wives, and the fact
that it is often most obvious that they are not justified to forsake the relationship.
Emotions are notoriously fickle, and can fluctuate too easily with the ups and downs of
life. An important question for such an individual to ask himself before placing too much
stock in his emotions is what actions has he performed or failed to perform which have
contributed to this loss of feeling? Action and inaction create emotions, as well as vice
versa. That emotions drive actions is well known and not denied here, but that a largely
symmetric and reciprocal relation holds between actions and emotions is less recognized.
It should be obvious that none of this is to trivialize feeling, incidentally. Jonathan
Edwards issued a warning against such a mistake, depicting it a wicked act
to propagate and establish a persuasion that all affections and sensible emotions of
the mind, in things of religion, are nothing at all to be regarded, but are rather to be
avoided and carefully guarded against, as things of a pernicious tendency. This [willl
bring all religion to a mere lifeless formality, and effectively shut out the power of
godliness, and everything which is spiritual and to have all true Christianity turned
out of doors.
As there is no true religion where there is nothing else but affection, so there is
no true religion where there is no religious affection.... If the great things of religion
are rightly understood, they will affect the heart.... This manner of slighting all religious affections is the way exceedingly to harden the hearts of men, and to encourage them in their stupidity and senselessness, and to keep them in a state of spiritual
death as long as they live and bring them at last to death eternaPS
Love as understood as encompassing both feeling and behavior is indeed commanded in
the New Testament, with the doxastic recognition that the latter can cultivate the former
and the former can impassion the latter.
That behavior can affect sentiments and shape character provides a compelling reason
why, at some stage of moral development, we as human beings are in need of guidelines
and moral rules to establish parameters within which behavior is allowable. Such a recognition enables a defense against Nowell-Smith's charge that obedience of God's commands is necessarily infantile. Eventually adherence to such guidelines can enable the kind
of mature moral life envisioned by Nowell-Smith, though with a different understanding

20

Theistic Ethics: Toward a Christian Solution

Baggett

of moral freedom. Moral freedom, according to Christian teaching, is not the autonOmy
to make up what is right and what is wrong, but the capacity to choose to do what is good
over what is evil. The morally and spiritually free, therefore, are not those who eXert
autonomy irrespective of the objective constraints on what is right and wrong, but who
freely choose to do that which is right and good.
This understanding of freedom is what may provide a way out of the Euthyphro
Dilemma. Recall that one of the homs of the dilemma, when morality was rooted in God
entailed the scary prospect of God issuing an immoral command, thereby making it right);
At least a partial solution to this problem is to call into question God's ability to sin; if God
could never issue such a command, the problem never arises. The problem with Such a
solution is that it doesn't seem a logical impossibility to consider God issuing such a command, despite Aquinas's attempt to portray it as such. Nevertheless theists like Robert
Adams wish to assert that it remains necessarily the case that God would not, and in some
sense could not, issue such a command. But how can such a limit be placed on the activities
of a God who, in the Anselmian sense, is omnipotent, able to do anything logically possible?
Such contemporary questions presuppose an understanding of freedom as the freedom from the constraints of standard rules or the impositions of others, the autonomy to
do whatever you want. But that construal of freedom is itself rather morally infantile,
more germane to our contemporary political context than to the moral and spiritual
realm. A deeper understanding of freedom construes it as the freedom not to actualize
certain possibilities. Stories abound of people who, in their expressions of personal autonomy, become enslaved to their vices. Genuine freedom is not just freedom to, but freedom from. God is free not to sin, and therefore free not to issue an immoral command.
However, if the statement "God is good" is understood as synthetic and substantive, and not merely analytic and a function of language, then its denial can't be selfcontradictory and therefore remains a broadly logical possibility. So how, you might
ask, can an event (like God issuing an immoral command) which is in some sense a
possibility nevertheless not be actually possible, and a proposition affirming the occurrence of such an event be necessarily false? Because God is the delimiter of possibilities, so that some states of affairs are conceivable, or epistemically possible, but not
really metaphysically possible. In this connection Morris writes
For the Anselmian holds that God exemplifies necessarily the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and goodness. Because of this, God has the unique ontological
role of being a delimiter of possibility. To put it simply, some maximal groupings of
propositions which, if per impossible, God did not exist would constitute possible
worlds, do not count as genuinely possible worlds due to the constraints placed on
possibility by the nature of the creator. Certain worlds can be described with full
consistency in first order logic but are such that, for example, their moral qualities
preclude their even possibly being actualized or allowed by an Anselmian God. 37
That love and such freedom are the ultimate product of morality thus understood liberates morality from a mere emphasis on rules and regulations. An understanding of
morality emancipated from slavish dependence on laws and guidelines makes sense of
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the inevitable grey areas that c.a~ .invariably be ~ound in dilemma. ethics. In t~e realm of
rules and duties and such, relatlvltle~ and exceptions. to the rule eX.lst; but that IS .more tolble in a system ruled not by an Impersonal Kantlan law to which human bemgs need
erabe unswervingly committed, but rather a personal God. Not an arb'Itrary G0d, exacer:ting the Euthyphro Dilemma, but one who always acts in love and keeps his promises,
ot out of compulsion, but out of His unchanging nature of love.
(1 The point, again, is not that God isn't free to do otherwise, but that He's free not to.
Preoccupation with whether God is free to do what is evil is a functio~ of what w~ can
[[ the Minimalist Strategy: talk of morality just in terms of rules and fights and duties, a
~ategy that is sometimes essential, often important, but never ultimate.J8 Morality as con\rued by theistic ethics points beyond what is penultimate and minimalist to that which
s ur acute if inchoate longing apprehends. It points to that place of morality on the other
~ de of rights and duties, where there shall be no occasion for any prohibition, envisioned
~y Mavrodes, quoted earlier, where "if one were to. speak either of his rights or his du~ies,
his remark might be met with puzzled laughter as hiS hearers struggled to recall an anCient
world in which those terms referred to something important."39
Morality is not the deepest thing .. .it is provisional and transitory ... due to serve its
use and then to pass away in favor of something richer and deeper:lo
REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS

Such idealizations are well and good, but perhaps recall for us the last challenge to theistic ethics that will be briefly treated here: Isn't religious adherence just disguised egoism
to get into heaven and avoid hell? As Alasdair MacIntyre writes,
If I am liable to be sent to hell for not doing what God commands, I am thereby
provided with a corrupting, because totally self-interested, motive for pursuing the
good. When self-interest is made as central as this, other motives are likely to dwindle in importance and a religious morality becomes self-defeating, at least insofar as
it was originally designed to condemn pure self-interest:"
This type of objection, Jerry Walls notes, has the most force when the sufferings of hell
are seen more as an externally imposed punishment, bearing no necessary relation to the
nature of the moral action involved. But the objection loses some of its momentum when
the anguish of hell is seen as a function of a life of evil. (To some extent, a similar point
may apply to the joy of heaven being a function of choosing good, though the grace of
God that enables heaven goes far beyond any merely natural consequences.) This point
too is vulnerable to a Kantian-styled objection that criticizes moral motivation to avoid evil
simply to avoid the anguish that is typically a natural consequence of such actions and
attitudes in a moral world. To the Kantian must be conceded some ground at this point;
heaven and hell do, at some level, appeal to self-interest.·ll
But not all self-interest is selfish, and proper self-interest is a legitimate part of genuine
moral motivation. 4J This is particularly the case when the self-interested motivation takes
for its normative form the renunciation of self-absorption and -indulgence. Further, an
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self-int~rest

s~fficiently m~tivated

action that is
one's
may ha:e been
by something
other than self-Interest to qualify as something for which to be pralsed:l " And even Kant
himself insisted that practical rationality demands the postulate of a God who will ensure
ultimately, that the virtuous are the happy. Mavrodes writes that "what we have in Kant i~
the recognition that there cannot be, in any 'reasonable' way, a moral demand upon me
unless reality itself is committed to morality in some deep way.""s Theistic ethics, it ha~
been argued, is the best explanation of how reality itself is thus committed, thus providino
a liberation from a Stoic commitment to morality without the psychologically vital confi~
dence that reality itself is ultimately concerned about the best interests of moral persons.
Lest this defensive maneuver designed to salvage the connection between God and
morality against Kant's objection lose sight of an important point, it should be remembered that what the theological stance is being criticized for here is the "vice" of solving a
heretofore intractable moral dilemma. That dilemma resides in attempting to reconcile
morality as concurrently requiring sacrifice of self-interest and protection of self-interest.
What has been presented are some steps in the direction of accounting for a meaningful,
coherent, and consistent way to retain both of these moral intuitions in synergistic balance, by distinguishing between short-term and long-term interest and pointing to the
nature of the ethical acts performed in a moral world.
Heaven and hell, thus understood within a matrix of orthodox religious beliefsaccording to which salvation is not earned but received through faith in Christ's sacrifice,
involving both orthodoxy and orthopraxy-can at least potentially offer substantive motivation to live morally, and perhaps even endure sacrifice of personal interest or even persecution. Since it is often agreed that the proper contents of ethics, generally speaking, are
not what is up for grabs so much as any sufficiently motivating factors to do what is right,
the doctrines of heaven and hell may well provide some hard and needed motivation to
live the kind of moral life that makes best sense when understood within a larger context
than this life alone.
CONCLUSION

To sum up, then, theistic ethics, following some of the suggestions in this paper, retains
the potential of being shown to account for moral facts better than secular ethics and to
provide a strong account of moral motivation. Such an ethic need not, and properly
understood does not, entail a simplistic correlation between doctrinal belief or religious
affiliation and moral practice, nor does it of necessity contain elements that are essentially
infantile. To the contrary, it affirms that all human beings, having been created in God's
imago dei, are capable of intuitively grasping and rationally understanding the moral order
which, given its salient features, has for its best explanation a theistic premise, providing
the best available account of love understood in more than a superficial way. Love thus
understood as more than mere emotion indeed can be commanded and thereby facilitate
the process of moral maturity by the reciprocal relationship that obtains between emotion
and action, according to a notion of freedom which also makes possible God's willful
inability to issue immoral commands: 6
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